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Abstract  
 
This paper offers additional insights on the interactions between economics a d politics in 
Portugal. We use an unexplored data set consisting of monthly polls on vote intentions for the 
main political parties in Portugal, since 1986. Results indicate that: (1) socialist governments had 
less electoral support than social democratic governments; (2) social democratic governments 
enjoyed a honeymoon period with the electorate while socialist governments did not; (3) vote 
intentions for incumbent parties tend to decrease with time in office; (4) voters hold incumbents 
responsible for the evolution of the economy; (5) the socialists are more penalized for rises in 
unemployment than are the social democrats. 
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Intro duction  
 
Although the literature analysing the interactions between economics and politics is quite 
extensive and has become one of the most active research areas in the last decades,1 the number 
of studies investigating the Portuguese case is extremely reduc d.2 With this paper we try to 
provide some clues to this under-resea ched topic by investigating the determinants of vote 
intentions for the main parties in Portugal. 
We use an unexplored data set consisting of monthly polls on vote intentions from 1986 
to 2000. Results suggest that (1) socialist governments had less electoral support than social 
democratic governments; (2) honeymoon effects existed for social democratic governments but 
not for socialist governments; (3) time in office decreases vote intentions for the governing party; 
(4) economic outcomes, specially inflation and unemployment, negatively affect vote intentions 
on the governing party, providing evidence in favour of the responsibility hypothesis; (5) the 
socialists are more penalized by increases in unemployment than are the social democrats, but no 
distinction is made by the electorate between these two parties on what concerns inflation. 
 The paper consists of five parts. The first part provides some background on political 
parties in Portugal. The second describes the data set and the third models the determinants of 
vote intentions. The fourth presents the empirical results and, finally, the last part reports the 
conclusions. 
                                                    
1 See Nannestad and Paldam (1994) for a survey on vote-popularity functions and Person and Tabellini (2000) for a 
recent survey on political economics. 
2 Veiga (1998) estimated popularity functions for the Portuguese President of the Republic, prime minister, 
government and Parliament. 
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Political parties in Portugal  
The military coup of April 25, 1974 re-established democracy in Portugal. It was followed 
by a two-year period of strong political instability during which the Junta of National Salvation 
and six temporary governments, ruled the country. Upon the approval of the new Constitution, 
which came into effect on April 25, 1976, legislative elections where held in the same day. Since 
then, four political parties have dominated the Portuguese political life. The Socialist Party (PS) 
and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) have always been the two major political parties, and 
alternated in power since 1976. The Communist Party (PCP) and the Social Democratic Center / 
Popular Party (CDS/PP) dispute the third position and were always in the opposition, except for a 
four-year period (1979-83) in which CDS/PP was a member of a government coalition led by 
PSD. Vote shares of these four political parties in legislative elections are shown in Table 1. A 
brief description of their history follows. 
 
[Insert table 1 about here]
 
Portuguese Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Português - PS) 
Center-left party founded in 1875, it was declared illegal during the dictatorship (1926-
74). In the first legislative elections for the Assembly of the Republic, in April 1976, the Socialist 
Party was the most voted party, with 34,98% of the votes. Mário Soares led the first 
Constitutional Government, and the following two, all of which came short of completing their 
terms. 
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In July 1985, Mário Soares decided to run for the Presidency. In October, the PSD won 
the legislative elections and the PS became part of the opposition.3 The party remained in the 
opposition until 1995, when it got 43,85% of the votes in the legislative elections. António 
Guterres, the party leader since 1992, became prime minister of a PS minority government. In the 
1999 balloting PS had its best result ever, with 44% of the votes, which gave the party exactly 
50% of the deputies in Parliament. 
 
Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata - PSD) 
Center- ight party, founded in May 1974, as the Popular Democratic Party (PPD), it 
adopted its current name in 1976. It remained in the opposition until 1979, when it formed the 
Democratic Alliance (AD) with the CDS and the Monarchic Popular Party (PPM). The AD won 
42,24% of the votes, getting an overall majo ity in Parliament. Sá Carneiro, leader and founder of 
PSD, became the prime minister in January 1980. In the October 1980 elections the AD renewed 
its overall majority of deputies but, two months later, Sá Carneiro died in an airplane accident 
and Pinto Balsemão was elected head of PSD and became Prime Minister. 
In the 1983 legislative elections, PSD ran alone and was the second most voted party. It 
then formed a coalition government with PS. In May 1985, Cavaco Silva was elected head of the 
Party and in June the PSD broke the coalition with PS and called for earlier elections. The 
President dissolved the Assembly and called for elections on October, in which PSD was the 
most voted party, with 29,79% of the votes. Cavaco Silva formed a minority government, which 
ended in April 1987 as a consequence of a no confidence vote. 
                                                    
3 In February 1986, Mário Soares won the second runoff of the most disputed presidential elections so far, to become 
the first civilian President of the Republic since 1974. He was elected President for a second term in 1991. In 1996, 
Jorge Sampaio, also a former PS leader, succeeded him in the Presidency. 
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In the legislative balloting of July 1987, the PSD won the first one-party overall majority 
since the end of the dictatorship (with 50,15% of the votes), which was renewed in October 1991. 
In February 1995, Cavaco Silva abandoned the PSD leadership, and since the October 1995 
elections the party has remained in the opposition. 
 
Social Democratic Center-Popular Party (Centro Democrático Social-Part do Popular/CDS-PP) 
Right-wing party, founded in 1974 as Democratic Social Center (CDS), it added the 
designation of Popular Party (CDS-PP) in 1993. In July 1979, it formed an electoral front with 
the PSD and the PPM called Democratic Alliance (AD), which won the 1979 and 1980 elections, 
giving CDS the opportunity to be part of the government. Since 1983, the CDS has remained in 
the opposition. In the January 1986 presidential balloting, the CDS candidate and former leader 
of the party, Diogo Freitas do Amaral, won 46% of the votes in the first run. He was, however, 
defeated in the runoff by Mário Soares (PS). Paulo Portas leads the party since March 1998.  
 
Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português - PCP) 
The Portuguese Communist Party was founded in 1921. It was banned in 1926 and 
legalized again in 1974. Between 1979 and 1986 the PCP formed the Popular Unity Alliance 
(Aliança Popular Unida - APU) with the small Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP/CDE). 
In 1987, the PCP formed a new alliance, known as Unitary Democratic Coalition (Coligação 
Democrática Unitária - CDU) with dissidents of the MDP, independent leftists and the Green-
Ecologist Party (PEV). Since 1991 the PCP has ran with PEV. Alvaro Cunhal was the leader of 
the party from the later years of the dictatorship until December 1992, when Carlos Carvalhas 
replaced him. The PCP was never a member of a constitutional government. 
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Data  
The period analysed in this paper begins in June 1986 and ends in September 2000. It 
includes three terms of social democratic governments and two terms of socialist governments. 
Table 2 describes the winning parties of legislative elections since the balloting of October 1985.  
 
[Insert table 2 about here]
 
Vote intention data was obtained from a weekly national journal called Expresso. The 
data results from polls conducted on a monthly basis by Euroexpansão t  a representative sample 
of about 600 Portuguese adults, by telephone interviews. Economic data consists of monthly 
unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted and standardized; consumer price indexes; and 
confidence indexes, all collected from OECD-Main Economic Indicators.  
 
Explaining vote intentions  
 The model we propose to explain vote intentions includes the following elements: leader 
characteristics, time in office, evaluations of the incumbent performa ce, and partisanship. It can 
be summarized in the following equation: 
 
VIt = a + b(L)VIt-1 + fLEADERt + hTIMEt  + gECOt-1 + d (PARTY*ECO) t-1 + ut             (1) 
 
where VIt, the dependent variable, is the percentage of vote intentions for the party under 
consideration at time t, and (L)VIt-1 are lags of the dependent variable. 
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 Leader characteristics are taken into account by including a vector of dummy variables 
for the party leaders (LEADER). In this way, we control for personality factors that may influence 
vote intentions. In fact, electoral scholars commonly accept that more popular lead rs increase 
party vote intentions.4 Table 3 describes the parties’ leaderships during the period under 
consideration.   
 
[Insert table 3 about here]
 
 Time in office (TIME) can influence vote intentions in several ways. First, recently elected 
parties may benefit from a honeymoon period with the electorate. We control for honeymoon 
effects by including a variable that takes the value of six in the first month of each term, declines 
to one in the sixth month and takes the value of zero thereafter. Second, ruling is costly in terms 
of popularity and, therefore, we expect vote intentions to decline with time in office. This is 
controlled by including a variable measuring the number of months in office or dummy variables 
for each term in office. 
  According to the responsibility hypothesis, vote intentions depend on evaluations of the 
incumbent performance, with both national (“sociotropic” voter) and personal conditions 
(“egotropic” voter) being influential. The vector of variables (ECO) we use to measure economic 
conditions includes the unemployment rate, the inflation rate, and the confidence index. The first 
two reflect national conditions while the latter considers both.5 All variables are one month 
lagged since it takes time for economic data to be released and for individuals to realise changes 
in economic conditions.  
                                                    
4 See Lanoue and Headrick (1994) for a study focusing on Great Britain. 
5 The confidence index is a weighted average of consumer responses to a set of five questions regarding personal and 
national, present and future, economic conditions. 
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 Because individuals’ vote intentions may depend upon partisan considerations (Swank, 
1993), the economic variables are multiplied by dummy variables indicating which party was in 
office (PARTY*ECO). The underlying idea is that since left-wing incumbents concentrate in 
improving real conditions, while conservative parties are more concerned with controlling 
inflation (Hibbs, 1977), the demand for the type of policies each party advocates increases when 
the economic variables they are more concerned with (unemployment, growth, etc.) get worse. 
Therefore, we expect left-wing oriented parties to benefit from increases in unemployment, and 
right-wing parties to gain support when inflation rises. 
 
Results  
 In this section we present OLS estimations of the model described above. We start by 
considering as dependent variable the vote intentions for the governing party. Then, we consider 
the government lead over the main opposition party and, finall , the vote intentions for the 
opposition parties.6  
 
 Vote intentions for the governing party  
 Since June 1986, our first observation, only two parties have been in power (the PSD, 
from 1985 to 1995; and the PS, since 1995), and all governments were single party. Results for 
our first set of estimations, which uses as dependent variable the percentage of vote intentions for 
the party in government, are shown in table 4. 
                                                    
6 Unit-root tests performed for these series indicate that all of them are stationary. 
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 [Insert table 4 about here]
 
 In the estimation reported in column 1, we use as indep ndent variables the first lag of the 
dependent variable (VI_GOV),7 a dummy (Guterres) that takes the value of one when Guterres is 
Prime Minister and zero otherwise, two variables accounting for honeymoon effects for the two 
parties (H_PS and H_PSD), the number of months in office (Tim _Gov), and the one-month 
lagged values of the inflation rate (Inflation),8 the unemployment rate (Un_Rate), and the 
confidence index (Conf_Index). Results show that vote intentions for the party in office are 
positively affected by their value in the last month and by honeymoon effects (only for the PSD). 
They also suggest that vote intentions are smaller when Guterres is Prime Minister (PS is in 
office), and that they tend to decrease with time in office and with increases in inflation or 
unemployment. Results regarding inflation and unemployment clearly support the responsibility 
hypothesis. As the confidence index does not seem to influence vote intentions, it was excluded 
from the following estimations.9 
 Then, we use alternative variables to control for the effects of time in office. Separating 
time in office for the PS and the PSD (Time_Gov_PS and Time_Gov_PSD) reveals that only the 
latter is statistically significant (column 3). When using dummy variables for terms in office
(column 4), there is clear evidence of vote intentions decreases over consecutive terms, and that 
both PS mandates were less popular than the first two PSD mandates.10  
                                                    
7 The number of lags of the dependent variable was chosen according to their statistical significance, in order to 
minimize the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), and to avoid problems of autocorrelation.   
8 The inflation rate is defined as the percentage change in the Portuguese consumer price index since the same month 
of the previous year (homologous inflation rate). 
9 When the confidence index is excluded from the estimation of column 1, t-statistics for the other variables and the 
F-statistic of the equation rise and the SBIC falls (see column 2).   
10 The term left out of the regression was PSD’s first (Term1_PSD). The dummy variable Guterres was not included 
in this estimation because it is equal to the sum of T rm1_PS and Term2_PS. 
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 Partisan effects are taken into account in the estimation of column 5 by multiplyi g the
economic variables by a dummy variable that takes the value of one when PS is in office.11 
Results indicate that voters do not tend to distinguish between PS and PSD governments when 
penalising them for higher inflation, whereas there is weak videnc  that PS governments tend to 
be more penalised for increases in unemployment. Therefore, we do not find support for Swank’s 
partisan (1993) hypothesis. Alternatively, we think that since the socialist political program 
attributes higher priority to improvements in real economic conditions than the social democratic 
program, Portuguese voters interpret a rise in the unemployment rate during a socialist 
government as revealing more government incompetence than if it had occurred during a social 
democratic incumbency. They, therefore, penalise more PS governments than a PSD 
governments for increases in the unemployment rate.12 
 
Government lead over the major opposition party  
Table 5 shows the results of four estimations using as dependent variable the difference 
between the percentage of vote intentions for the party in office and that for the major party in the 
opposition. 
 
 
[Insert table 5 about here]
                                                    
11 The resulting variables are: (Inflation*PS), (Unemp_Rate*PS), and (Conf_Index*PS). 
12 Other economic variables for which monthly data is available, such as the change in the industrial production 
index or in the real exchange rate, were added to the estimations. Rults, not reported here, did not change 
significantly. 
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 Results further confirm those reported in table 4. As before, there is strong evidence 
supporting tha the first lag of the dependent variable and the honeymoon variable for the PSD 
have positive effects on government lead. Furthermore, government lead is lower when Guterres 
is prime minister and tends to decrease with time (months) in office, inflation, and 
unemployment. It is also worth mentioning that the honeymoon variable for the PS governments 
and the confidence index13 are not statistically significant, as happened in the estimations 
reported in table 4. 
 When controlling for partisan effects (columns 3 and 4), there is strong evidence that the 
government lead decreases more during socialist governments than during social democratic 
incumbencies when unemployment rises. There is also weak evidence that the government lead 
of PS governments tends to decreas  when the confidence index increases. On what concerns 
inflation increases, voters do not seem to discriminate between PS and PSD governments. 
 
Vote intentions for the opposition parties  
Finally, we decided to analyse vote intentions for the opposition partie . First, using as 
dependent variable the vote intentions for the major opposition party,14 and as explanatory 
variables those used in the estimations reported in table 4. As expected, the significance of the 
variables was the same as for vote intentions for the governing party, and the signs of the 
estimated coefficients were symmetrical.15 
                                                    
13 As happened in table 4, when the confidence index is excluded from the estimation of column 1, t-statistics for 
most of the other variables and the F-statistic of the equation rise and the SBIC falls (see column 2).   
14 From 1986 to October 1995, the Socialist Party and, since then, the Social Democratic Party.
15 Since results are very similar to those of table 4 (with the inverse signs), they are not reported here. They are, 
however, available from the authors upon request. 
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 Then, we performed estimations for the other two important opposition parties, CDS/PP 
and PCP. Recall that these two parties were never in office during the period under analysis. 
Therefore, their vote intentions were modelled as functions of previous values of the vote 
intentions, leader characteristics, and economic variables. Results are shown in table 6. 
 
[Insert table 6 about here]
 
 Two main conclusions are suggested by the analysis of these estimations. First, vote 
intentions on CDS/PP and PCP do not seem to be affected by their leaders’ personality. Second, 
both parties get higher vote intentions when the economy gets worse: the CDS/PP benefits from 
decreases in the confidence index, while the PCP gains from inflation or unemployment 
increases. These results provide some additional evidence in favour of the responsibility 
hypothesis. Voters blame incumbent parties for bad economic results and, therefore, during
economic hardships, opposition parties’ proposals receive more support. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 The main objective of this paper was to investigate the determinants of vote intentions in 
Portugal. Do vote intentions depend on who is leading the party? Do the Portuguese blame 
incumbents for the evolution of the economy? Does time in office influence vote intentions? 
These are some of the questions that provided the starting point for the research. Then, we used 
an unexplored data set consisting of vote intentions obtained from monthly polls performed since 
1986 until present, to conduct a series of estimations of voting functions for Portuguese political 
parties. 
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 Our results provide an additional light on the interactions between economics and politics 
in Portugal. In previous research, Veiga (1998) estimated popularity functions for the main 
political entities in Portugal: the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Government 
and the Parliament. The results strongly favoured the responsibility hypothesis, with 
unemployment, and to a lesser extent inflation, affecting popularity levels. Results found in this 
paper corroborate this conclusion: vote intentions in the incumbent party increase when the 
economy is performing well, while vote intentions in the opposition rise in the reverse case. We 
also found evidence that a rise in the unemployment rate exerts a stronger influence on vote 
intentions than a similar rise in the inflation rate. On what concerns partisan considerations, 
results suggest that the socialists are more penalized for rises in unemployment than the social 
democrats, which contradicts Swanks (1993) partisan hypothesis. 
 Our analysis also reveals that: (1) PS governments had less electoral support than PSD 
governments; (2) PSD governments enjoyed a honeymoon period with the electorate during the 
first months of incumbency while PS governments did not; (3) vote intentions in incumbent 
parties tend to decrease with time in office.
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Table 1:  Legislative electoral results  
 PS  PPD/PSD  CDS/PP  AD  PCP  
1976  34,98% 24,03% 15,89% - 14,5% 
1979  27,43% - - 42,24% 18,96%(2) 
1980  27,13%(1) - - 44,4% 16,92%(2) 
1983  36,35% 27,04% 12,38% - 18,2%(2) 
1985  20,82% 29,79% 9,74% - 15,55%(2) 
1987  22,3% 50,15% 4,34% - 12,18%(3) 
1991  29,25% 50,43% 4,38% - 8,8%(4) 
1995  43,85% 34% 9,09% - 8,61%(5) 
1999  44% 32,3% 8,4% - 9%(5) 
Notes: PS – Socialist Party; PPD/PSD – Popular Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party; CDS/PP – 
Social Democratic Center / Popular Party; AD - Democratic Alliance (PSD + CDS + PPM - 
Monarchic Popular Party); PCP – Portuguese Communist Party. 
 (1) Socialist Revolutionary Front (FRS): PS + smallsocialist parties. 
 (2) Popular Unity Alliance (APU): PCP + MDP/CDE (Portuguese Democratic Movement). 
 (3) Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU): PCP + dissidents of MDP + PEV (Green-Ecologist Party). 
 (4) PCP + PEV 
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Table 2:  Legislative elections and parti es in government  
Dates of 
elections 
Winning 
party 
Share in 
Parliament Prime Minister 
Form of 
government 
     October 5, 1985 
July 19, 1987 
October 6, 1991 
October 1, 1995 
October 10, 1999 
PSD 
PSD 
PSD 
PS 
PS 
34% 
59% 
58% 
48% 
50% 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
António Guterres 
António Guterres 
One party, minority 
One party 
One party 
One party, minority 
One party 
Note: PSD – Social Democratic Party; PS – Socialist Party. 
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Table 3:  Party leaders since June 1986  
PS  PSD  CDS/PP  PCP  
Leader  Period  Leade r Period  Leader  Period  Leader  Period  
Victor 
Constâncio 
6/86 -
12/89 
Cavaco 
Silva 
5/85-
1/95 
Adriano 
Moreira 
10/1985-
1/1988 
Álvaro 
Cunhal 
Until 
11/92 
Jorge 
Sampaio 
1/89-1/92 Fernando 
Nogueira 
2/95-
3/96 
Freitas do 
Amaral 
2/88-
10/91 
Carlos 
Carvalhas 
12/92-
present 
António 
Guterres 
2/92 -
present 
Marcelo 
Rebelo de 
Sousa 
4/96-
3/99 
Adriano 
Moreira 
11/91-
2/92 
  
  Durão 
Barroso 
4/99 - 
present 
Manuel 
Monteiro 
3/92-2/98   
    Paulo 
Portas 
3/98-
present 
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Table 4:  Vote Intentions for the Party in Government  
 1  2  3  4  5  
      Constant 33.41 
(5.53)*** 
33.70 
(5.69)*** 
31.73 
(5.21)*** 
23.64 
(5.15)*** 
34.50 
(5.36)*** 
      VI_GOV (-1) .52 
(9.13)*** 
.52 
(9.21)*** 
.52 
(9.21)*** 
.45 
(5.80)*** 
.49 
(8.55)*** 
      VI_GOV (-2)    .15 
(2.04)** 
 
      Guterres -5.56 
(-2.85)*** 
-5.66 
(-2.96)*** 
-6.28 
(-3.20)*** 
 -4.00 
(-1.04) 
      H_PS -.07 
(-.27) 
-.07 
(-.30) 
-.09 
(-.36) 
.01 
(.06) 
-.11 
(-.49) 
      H_PSD 1.18 
(5.35)*** 
1.20 
(5.59)*** 
1.28 
(5.76)*** 
1.60 
(6.72)*** 
1.25 
(5.62)*** 
      Time_Gov. -.08 
(-3.93)*** 
-.08 
(-4.48)*** 
  -.09 
(-4.63)*** 
      Time_Gov_PS   -.04 
(-1.32) 
  
      Time_Gov_PSD   -.08 
(-4.39)*** 
  
      Term2_PSD    -3.33 
(-2.95)*** 
 
      Term3_PSD    -5.48 
(-3.70)*** 
 
      Term1_PS    -4.21 
(-2.14)** 
 
      Term2_PS    -5.75 
(-2.18)** 
 
      Inflation (-1) -.67 
(-3.26)*** 
-.67 
(-3.27)*** 
-.60 
(-2.84)*** 
-.32 
(-1.73)* 
-.69 
(-3.10)*** 
      (Inflation*PS) (-1)     .91 
(1.38) 
      Unemp_Rate (-1) -.69 
(-2.04)** 
-.74 
(-2.72)*** 
-.53 
(-1.67)* 
-.46 
(-1.72)* 
-.59 
(-1.79)* 
      (Unemp_Rate*PS) (-1)     -.75 
(-1.92)* 
      Conf_Index (-1) .01 
(.27) 
    
            Adjusted R2 .77 .77 .77 .74 .77 
      F-Statistic 70.5*** 88.0*** 71.5*** 48.0*** 64.7*** 
      Schwarz B.I.C. 414.2 411.6 413.3 408.6 414.2 
      # Observations 164 164 164 160 164 
      
Sources: OECD-MEI, Expresso, and National Elections Commission. 
Notes:  - t-statistics are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- models estimated by OLS.
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Table 5 : Government lead over the major opposition party  
 1  2  3  4  
     Constant 33.31 
(4.56)*** 
32.21 
(4.66)*** 
29.07 
(3.84)*** 
31.91 
(4.12)*** 
     Gov_Lead (-1) .53 
(9.13)*** 
.53 
(9.20)*** 
.51 
(8.70)*** 
.48 
(7.91)*** 
     Guterres -10.34 
(-3.56)*** 
-10.01 
(-3.57)*** 
-3.06 
(-.55) 
-3.82 
(-.69) 
     H_PS -.38 
(-1.03) 
-.36 
(-.99) 
-.48 
(-1.30) 
-.39 
(-1.07) 
     H_PSD 1.56 
(4.84)*** 
.51 
(4.91)*** 
1.68 
(5.24)*** 
1.73 
(5.12)*** 
     Time_Gov. -.16 
(-4.90)*** 
-.15 
(-5.29)*** 
-.16 
(-5.19)*** 
-.17 
(-5.15)*** 
     Inflation (-1) -1.20 
(-3.98)*** 
-1.19 
(-3.96)*** 
-1.10 
(-3.37)*** 
-1.23 
(-3.70)*** 
     (Inflation*PS) (-1)   .44 
(.47) 
-.17 
(-.17) 
     Unemp_Rate (-1) -1.68 
(-3.25)*** 
-1.53 
(-3.71)*** 
-1.09 
(-2.23)** 
-1.17 
(-2.13)** 
     (Unemp_Rate*PS) (-1)   -1.28 
(-2.25)** 
-1.71 
(-2.82)*** 
     Conf_Index (-1) -.03 
(-.46) 
  .01 
(.25) 
     (Conf_Index*PS) (-1)    -.31 
(-1.95)* 
          Adjusted R2 .81 .81 .81 .82 
     F-Statistic 89.9*** 103.2*** 82.4*** 68.7*** 
     Schwarz B.I.C. 474.6 472.1 474.6 477.5 
     # Observations 164 164 164 164 
     
Sources: OECD-MEI, Expresso, and National Elections Commission. 
Notes: - T-statistics are in parentheses; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, 
and *, 10%; 
- Models estimated by OLS; 
- Government lead was defined as the difference between the vote intentions 
for the party in government and the major party of the opposition. 
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Table 6:  Vote Intentions on CDS/PP and PCP  
 CDS/PP  CDU  
Constant .98 
(.82) 
1.49 
(2.59)** 
   Vote Int. (-1) .56 
(6.87)*** 
.17 
(2.36)** 
   Vote Int. (-2) .11 
(1.36) 
.33 
(4.59)*** 
   Leader1 -.62 
(-.44) 
-.38 
(-.70) 
   Leader2 -.31 
(-.33) 
 
   Leader3 -.15 
(-.17) 
 
   Leader4 -.58 
(-1.00) 
 
   Inflation (-1) -.01 
(-.13) 
.16 
(2.52)** 
   Unemp_Rate (-1) .14 
(.63) 
.16 
(1.93)* 
   Conf_Index (-1) -.04 
(-1.99)** 
.02 
(1.55) 
      Adjusted R2 .61 .57 
   F-Statistic 29.4*** 36.2*** 
   Schwarz B.I.C. 289.6 256.7 
   # Observations 160 160 
   
Sources: OECD-MEI, Expresso, and National Elections Commission. 
Notes: - T-statistics are in parentheses; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: 
***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- Models estimated by OLS. 
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Table 6:  Vote Intentions for the major opposition party  
 1  2  3  
    Constant -.751 
(-.25) 
.70 
(.24) 
3.95 
(1.23) 
    VI_Gov (-1) .47 
(7.00)*** 
.49 
(7.53)*** 
.49 
(7.38)*** 
    Guterres 5.54 
(3.79)*** 
4.86 
(3.52)*** 
-.31 
(-.11) 
    H_PS .31 
(1.59) 
.28 
(1.46) 
.35 
(1.78)* 
    H_PSD -.42 
(-2.50)** 
-.34 
(-2.16)** 
-.46 
(-2.74)*** 
    Time_Gov. .09 
(5.31)*** 
.08 
(5.50)*** 
.07 
(5.16)*** 
    Inflation (-1) .61 
(4.13)*** 
.58 
(3.95)*** 
.47 
(2.98)*** 
    Inflation*PS (-1)   .38 
(.78) 
    Unemp_Rate (-1) 1.13 
(3.98)*** 
.87 
(4.06)*** 
.58 
(2.28)** 
    Unemp_Rate*PS (-1)   .55 
(1.83)* 
    Conf_Index (-1) .04 
(1.39) 
  
        Adjusted R2 .73 .72 .73 
    F-Statistic 56.1*** 63.5*** 50.7*** 
    Schwarz B.I.C. 370.8 369.3 372.0 
    # Observations 164 164 164 
    
Sources: OECD-MEI, Expresso, and National Elections Commission. 
Notes: - t-statistics are in parentheses; 
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; 
**, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- models estimated by OLS.
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Table 7:  Vote Intentions for the two major parties (PS and PSD)  
 1  2  3  4  5  
       PS  PS  PS  PSD  PSD  
Constant 8.40 
(3.57)*** 
7.81 
(2.85)*** 
7.75 
(2.84)*** 
10.89 
(4.95)*** 
9.59 
(2.86)*** 
      Vote Int. (-1) .48 
(5.92)*** 
.46 
(5.59)*** 
.47 
(5.76)*** 
.38 
(4.88)*** 
.37 
(4.63)*** 
      Vote Int. (-2) .19 
(2.36)** 
.19 
(2.32)** 
.17 
(2.18)** 
.17 
(2.27)** 
.17 
(2.37)** 
      Government 2.41 
(2.76)*** 
3.94 
(1.46) 
4.27 
(1.59) 
5.35 
(2.89)*** 
7.21 
(1.37) 
      Honeymoon .27 
(1.23) 
.26 
(1.18) 
.27 
(1.24) 
1.52 
(6.10)*** 
1.50 
(5.83)*** 
      Leader1    -2.19 
(-1.02) 
-2.79 
(-1.03) 
      Leader2 -3.42 
(-3.51)*** 
-3.79 
(-3.36)*** 
-4.22 
(-4.48)*** 
-4.71 
(-2.68)*** 
-5.55 
(-2.36)** 
      Leader3 -1.36 
(-1.56) 
-1.27 
(-1.42) 
-1.48 
(-1.78)* 
-.93 
(-1.04) 
-1.55 
(-1.10) 
      Inflation (-1) .20 
(1.58) 
.24 
(1.70)* 
.23 
(1.62) 
-.09 
(-.63) 
1.17 
(1.45) 
      Inflation*Gov (-1)  .80 
(1.41) 
.55 
(1.04) 
 -1.28 
(-1.54) 
      Unemp_Rate (-1) .23 
(1.15) 
.42 
(1.39) 
.55 
(2.15)** 
.74 
(3.11)*** 
.80 
(1.41) 
      Unemp_Rate*Gov (-1)  -.30 
(-.75) 
-.54 
(-1.57) 
 .04 
(.07) 
      Conf_Index (-1) -.02 
(-.66) 
-.02 
(-.69) 
 .11 
(2.54)* 
.25 
(1.98)** 
      Conf_Index*Gov (-1)  .12 
(1.42) 
  -.13 
(-.99) 
            Adjusted R2 .86 .86 .86 .82 .82 
      F-Statistic 109.8*** 83.6*** 100.1*** 76.3*** 59.0*** 
      Schwarz B.I.C. 367.6 372.7 368.8 406.7 412.5 
      # Observations 160 160 160 160 160 
      
Sources: OECD-MEI, Expresso, and National Elections Commission. 
Notes: - T-statistics are in parentheses; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%; 
- Models estimated by OLS. 
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Table 8:  Vote Intentions for CDS/PP and CDU  
 1  2  3  4  
      CDS/PP  CDS/PP  CDU  CDU  
Constant .98 
(.82) 
1.41 
(3.36)*** 
1.49 
(2.59)** 
1.42 
(2.47)** 
     Vote Int. (-1) .56 
(6.87)*** 
.57 
(7.06)*** 
.17 
(2.36)** 
.20 
(2.79)*** 
     Vote Int. (-2) .11 
(1.36) 
.13 
(1.64) 
.33 
(4.59)*** 
.35 
(4.96)*** 
     Leader1 -.62 
(-.44) 
-.23 
(-.54) 
-.38 
(-.70) 
.24 
(.64) 
     Leader2 -.31 
(-.33) 
-.31 
(-.96) 
  
     Leader3 -.15 
(-.17) 
-.16 
(-.22) 
  
     Leader4 -.58 
(-1.00) 
-.45 
(-1.44) 
  
     Inflation (-1) -.01 
(-.13) 
 .16 
(2.52)** 
.10 
(1.97)* 
     Unemp_Rate (-1) .14 
(.63) 
 .16 
(1.93)* 
.09 
(1.28) 
     Conf_Index (-1) -.04 
(-1.99)** 
-.05 
(-2.95)*** 
.02 
(1.55) 
 
          Adjusted R2 .61 .61 .57 .56 
     F-Statistic 29.4*** 37.8*** 36.2*** 42.6** 
     Schwarz B.I.C. 289.6 285.2 256.7 255.4 
     # Observations 160 160 160 160 
     
Sources: OECD-MEI, Expresso, and National Elections Commission. 
Notes: - T-statistics are in parentheses; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, 
and *, 10%; 
- Models estimated by OLS. 
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Appendix 1
Vote intentions for the four main political parties 
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Economic data 
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